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Tatarstan’s degree of political, economic and cultural sovereignty within the 
Russian Federation is the result of Soviet era ethno-national politics. The re-
adoption of the ethnic federal state model in 1992 by Russia allowed ethnic regions 
such as Tatarstan to challenge the federal authorities for con-federal relations 
within the Federation. The Tatar leadership has attempted to work within the 
institutional and legal framework of the Russian Federation in an attempt to codify 
their state sovereignty within the Russian Federation. The political and economic 
concessions gained through tedious negotiation with the center have provided the 
Republic with the means to build a culturally distinct and semi sovereign state in the 
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 Federalism has occupied a central role in Russian domestic policy since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Very much like the Soviet Union, Russia 
experienced the devolution of state power along ethnic lines which severely 
threatened the formation of a stable federal government in the decade following the 
Soviet collapse. Unlike the other union republics, Russia lacked its own independent 
government apart from the union-wide apparatus of the CPSU while possessing a 
large concentration of semi-autonomous ethnic republics within its territory.  
It is widely agreed that growing national self-awareness in the union 
republics was a key contributor to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The political 
liberalizations, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988, afforded nationalist 
movements within the Union’s ethnic territories the opportunity to pressure their 
governments to rebuff the heavily centralized authority of the CPSU. In August of 
1990, the newly elected Chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet, reformist Boris 
Yeltsin, went to Kazan and urged Russian regional leaders to “take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow” in an effort to gain the support necessary to resist 
the authority of the CPSU. Later that month Tatarstan declared itself a sovereign 
republic within the Soviet Union. This made Tatarstan the first autonomous 
republic, a third-tier ethnic entity tied to the RSFSR, to emulate the other union 




stance put the Republic at odds with Russia because such a move effectively 
equalized the sovereign status of Tatarstan and Russia within the federal hierarchy 
of the Soviet Union. 
The Tatar position was publically affirmed in 1992 in a Republic-wide 
referendum before it was subsequently codified in the Republic’s constitution later 
that year. The Tatar constitution stating that Tatarstan “shall be a sovereign state 
subject to international law, associated with the Russian Federation,” reflected the 
Republic’s Soviet era stance and framed its stance toward a strong central state 
during the early 1990’s. The results of the referendum and the Republic’s 
constitution were cited as the key reasons why the Tatar leadership refused to sign 
the 1992 Federation Treaty which was supposed to establish the legal underpinning 
of the Russian Federation (RF). Along with Tatarstan, the Chechen Republic was the 
only other autonomous republic that refused to sign the Federation Treaty.  
Whereas Chechnya entered a bloody war of succession with the central 
authorities, Tatarstan retained a cold stance toward Moscow until Russia 
acknowledged Tatarstan’s associated relationship with the Federation by the 
conclusion of the Russian-Tatar Bilateral Treaty in 1994. The Bilateral Treaty 
granted Tatarstan significant autonomy in political, economic and cultural spheres 
which Tatar leaders have used since then to develop a distinctly non-Russian civil 




 If as Dmitry Gorenburg explains, “virtually every ethnic minority in the 
Soviet Union organized nationalist movements that were initially similar in form 
and goals…,” how then did Tatarstan avoid the same fate as Chechnya while 
attaining a negotiated relationship with the Russian Federation for continued 
development of their national identity (Gorenburg 2003, xi)? The answer to this lies 
in the level of sovereignty Tatar leaders ultimately pursued and the tactics they 
employed vis-à-vis the relatively weak Russian Federation. In short the persistent 
assertion of an associated relationship with the RF between 1991 and 1994 and a 
level of nominal cooperation afforded the Republic the opportunity to avoid armed 
conflict with the center while maximizing on Yeltsin’s promises of sovereignty.  
It is commonly agreed that Tatarstan’s sovereignty drive ended with the 
conclusion of the Bilateral Treaty in 1994. The most important effect of the bilateral 
treaty in the context of Russian-Tatar relations is that it affirmed the associated 
relationship of Tatarstan with Russia on the basis of the Tatar people’s right to 
national self-determination.  This was derived directly from the platform of the 
Tatar Public Center (TPC), the Republic’s nationalist movement, which demanded 
the right to pursue cultural, linguistic and political sovereignty.  During the early 
1990’s Tatarstan’s President, Mintimer Shaimiev, worked to moderate the influence 
of the more radical nationalistic demands while resisting full integration into the RF. 
This allowed Shaimiev to maintain political control of the Republic while taking full 




elements of Soviet era ethnic policies regarding both the legal relationship of the 
Republic to the RF and the development of nationalistic policies in the Republic. 
There are two key factors that have contributed to the success and continued 
development of Tatarstan’s national identity within the Russian Federation. The 
first is a result of the Soviet policy of limiting political mobilization through ethnic 
national institutions thereby politicizing ethnic nationalism, and the second factor is 
the decision of Russia’s political leaders to adopt the soviet style ethno federal 
model used in the creation of the Russian Federation. These two factors are 
inextricably intertwined because Russia had both a disproportionately high number 
of autonomous ethnic regions and no national government of its own apart from the 
all-Union government in Moscow. Thus, when the Russian opposition attempted to 
build a government to counter the CPSU they were forced to seek the support of 
Russia’s various regions.  
Yeltsin Era politics are generally characterized by a weak or non-existent 
central government, especially in the Russian regions, and the proliferation of 
informal agreements between the center and Russia’s regional leaders. In contrast 
Putin era politics are characterized by the attempt to re-centralized state power and 
limit regional influence on national politics. This specifically refers to the annulment 
of more than half of Russia’s bilateral treaties with its subjects and the realignment 
of regional laws with the Russian Constitution. In spite of this, Tatarstan still retains 




political autonomy was rolled back, the Republic has been successful in maintaining 
and building on its national development in the cultural sphere. At present the 
Republic has policies regulating the teaching and usage of the Russian and Tatar 
languages, a significant degree of regional economic regulation, and the regulation 
of foreign relations outside Russian foreign policy. The majority of these current 
policies are directly linked to the concessions attained through the Republic’s 
actions up to the signing of the Bilateral Treaty in 1994. In short Tatarstan’s level of 
cultural sovereignty has added substantial national content to Russia’s ethnic 
federal system.  
Ethnic Federalism 
 The development of the Russian Federation and its relations with regions 
such as Tatarstan fit in the much broader realm of Soviet ethnic politics. Two of the 
major causes of early Russian instability was the lack of a an independent central 
government apart from the all-Union CPSU infrastructure in Moscow and Russia’s 
own concentration of 21 autonomous regions. This left Russian leaders with very 
little choice but to directly negotiate with the ethnic regions for support in building 
a new federative government. This is largely responsible for the latitude taken by 
Tatarstan during the formation of the RF. In the case of Tatarstan, many of the key 
elements of Soviet ethnic federalism were reformed and codified in the basis of the 




The majority of explanations for the development of Russian federalism are 
found in structural arguments. These arguments focus on how the ethnic national 
structures organized by territory, ethnic elite cadres, and language, affected center-
periphery relations in the USSR and later influenced the development of the RF.  The 
Soviet Union, a unitary state, was organized and administered through ethnic-
territorial divisions or natsii. When Russia separated from the Soviet Union central 
authorities adopted the ethnic-territorial structure of the USSR and attempted to 
form true federal relations between the center and periphery. Thus, Russian leaders 
imported a platform with a precedence of prior ethnic mobilization that enabled its 
ethnic regions to further build on Soviet era concessions. 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 
The ethnic-territorial component of Russia’s federal system is an inherited 
legacy of the Soviet Union which is crucial to understanding the development of 
center-regional relations within the RF. Ethnic nationalism is generally accepted as 
one of the key causes of Soviet disintegration. The underlying assumption here is 
that the ethnic structure of the Soviet state created an incubator for nationalism. 
The extent to which ethnic cleavages influence nationalism is dependent on 
how one interprets social identity and its formation.  Primordialists believe that the 
commonalities of history, kinship and belief precede all other forms of identity. The 
idea of primordialism is largely based on the work of Clifford Geertz who 




inherited conceptions that are symbolically expressed in the communication, 
perpetuation and development of a society’s worldview. Primordialists argue that 
these commonalities produce such intense emotions that they are largely immutable 
in comparison to subsequent social ties (Cohen 1999, 4-5).  Therefore the root cause 
of ethnic conflict is derived from the tendency of ethnic groups to “cleave and 
compare” themselves with others (Horrowitz 1985, 3-94). As Robin Cohen points 
out, primordialism is mostly used by scholars today as a descriptor rather than the 
cause of societal conflict (Cohen1999, 10).   
Most scholars are reluctant to deny that primordial perceptions exist in 
society, but those of the constructivist camp deny that it is the cause of ethnic 
conflict. Constructivists believe identity, ethnic or otherwise, is a modern construct 
used by elites to garner power within plural societies. There are two variations of 
the constructivist belief which differ on how ethnic identity is shaped, neither of 
which is mutually exclusive. Instrumentalists believe that identity is created and 
manipulated by elites for political proposes, while institutionalists believe that 
political institutions shape the perceptions, opinions and identity of the broader 
populace (Sonntag 1995, 91-92). Both of these views are derived from the belief that 
nationalism is a relatively modern idea and that ethnicity is but one cleavage used in 
the creation of the nation as an idea. While ethnicity is a combination of so-called 
primordial attributes, the nation is a creation comprised of a named human 




symbols, mythology and a suitably tailored history. Together these elements lend 
legitimacy and stability to the resulting state (Gellner 1999, 37-39).  
Prior the revolution in 1917, the Russian populace was predominately rural 
and largely comprised of peasants. These people were largely unified by their place 
of birth, the common history of their locality and by the language they spoke. Both 
Francine Hirsch and Phillip Roeder aptly illustrate how the Soviets first shaped 
ethnicity and then institutionalized ethnic identities in the Soviet Union. In a 1997 
article, The Soviet Union as a Work in Progress: Ethnographers and the Category of 
Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses, Francine Hirsch shows how Soviet 
leaders and ethnographers struggled to define nationality in the primordial terms of 
language, place of birth, and ethnic/national self identification. She points out that, 
Soviet ethnographers were thwarted by the inability of certain populations to give a 
coherent answer on the question of nationality as some respondents replied with 
the name of their village (Hirsch 1997, 259). In the words of Henry Hale, this proves 
that “these groups did not have a mass group consciousness prior to the creation of 
their administrative territories” (Hale 2003, 234). 
In a 1991 article, Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization, Phillip Roeder 
explored the basis of Soviet Federalism and its effects on the state of national-center 
relations in the Soviet Union a year before its collapse. Roeder maintained that the 
nationalities policies of the Soviet Union were instrumentalist agendas developed to 




authorities.  He concluded that while this plan seemed plausible in the early years of 
the Soviet Union the plan was beginning to backfire as regional elites built up their 
own local support bases independent of the central authorities. It has been noted 
that the development of the nationalities polices were intended to be a transitory 
step toward the development of a Soviet national identity (Lynn and Novikov 1997, 
192). 
Elites 
Prior to the implementation of the bilateral treaty process much attention 
was focused on the intentions of Russia’s ethnic elites. Some scholars argued that 
the sovereignty movements were merely used to aid in the re-entrenchment of the 
elite in the Post Soviet Era. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss expands on Roeder’s work by 
examining Russian institutions during Russian’s transition from the planned Soviet 
economy in Local Heroes. Her findings indicate that the Soviet institutions and the 
methods employed by some elites operated in much the same fashion as they had 
during the Soviet era. In Resisting the State, Stoner-Weiss builds on her earlier work, 
illustrating how elite entrenchment over the control of resources brought the Soviet 
economy to halt. Her later work suggests that the continued ability of regional elites 
to usurp authority over economic assets in the post-Soviet period has allowed some 
regional government to meet societal demands better than federal institutions. In 
short, economically framed policies targeting titular populations allowed ethnic 





Since the mid-1990’s the scholarly focus has shifted toward the impact of 
regional autonomy on the future of Russian federalism and the center’s ability to 
reassert control over Russia’s subjects. In their 1997 article, Refederalizing Russia: 
Debates on the Idea of Federalism in Russia, Lynn and Novikov examined the basis of 
Russian federalism to assess the future shape of center-periphery relations in 
Russia. The obstacles they identified ranged from economic to social considerations, 
but they ultimately concluded that the crux of the issue rested in the legal 
interpretation of Russia’s federalism in the coming decades. 
The two documents used to establish Russian federalism were the 1992 
Federation Treaty and the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation.  The 
Federation Treaty was a contractual document that incorporated Russia’s subjects, 
with the exception of Tatarstan and Chechnya, into the Federation. The Constitution, 
drafted and ratified after the Federation Treaty, established the basis of Russia’s 
federal authority over the regions.   
 In the cases where regions opted out of the Federation Treaty or had major 
disputes with the central authorities, bilateral treaties were signed between the 
center and individual regions to cement federal relations. In his book Shadow 
Separatism, Matthew Crosston demonstrated that regional leaders managed to 
sculpt the ambiguities of the key documents establishing Russian federalism in the 




authorities, the bilateral treaty process facilitated the negotiation of concessions 
that were ultimately in contradiction to the Russian Constitution (Article 5) by 
creating varying degrees of power among the subjects of the Russian Federation. 
Many scholars of Russian Federalism cite the failure of Russian leaders to clearly 
define and delineate federal and regional powers in the documents establishing the 
organization of the state as a key contributing factor in the devolution of federal 
authority (Crosston 2004, 23-48; Stoner-Weiss 2001, 111-122). 
Education and Language Policy 
 Language has often been cited as a key element of the primordial identity 
because of its power to contain a society’s world-view (Spolksy 2004, 7-11). Dmitri 
Gorenburg published several works that examined Soviet ethnic institutions and 
their role in shaping the sovereignty drives of the former Autonomous Republics 
(ASSR) currently encompassed within the Russian Federation. In his 2003 book 
Ethnic Mobility in the Russian Federation he focused on the role of ethnic institutions 
and the benefits they afforded regional elites in the mobilization of their populations 
in support for culture-building campaigns in Russia’s regions.  In two prior articles, 
Gorenburg argued that regional elites embarked on campaigns to quietly expand the 
cultural revival programs first initiated by the regional nationalist fronts that 
formed in the late 1980’s while publicly touting the economic benefits of state 
sovereignty. Gorenburg cites what Elise Giulianno has called ‘ethnic outbidding’ 




successful in usurping the power of the nationalist movements in their endeavors to 
gain power through state building platforms (Gorenburg, 1999). However, Giulianno 
maintains that in the case of Tatarstan neither ethnic mobilization nor nationalist 
mobilization occurred (Giuliano 2000, 295). Gorenburg and Giulianno contradict 
other scholars such as Daniel Triesman who argue that regional leaders simply 
agitated the central government in an attempt to garner a greater share of subsidies 
in an effort to retain power (Triesman 1996). 
 Other scholars argue that the cultural elements of Tatarstan’s regional policy 
indicate the assertion of cultural autonomy as an extension of the republic’s 
somewhat limited political sovereignty (Crosston 2004; Graney 1999; Kondrashov 
2000; Sharafutdinova 2003).  The development of national symbols, such as flags, 
languages and architectural styles, as Gorenburg argues, is akin to filling the empty 
national forms of the Soviet era with real content. In her 2003 article, Paradiplomacy 
in the Russian Regions: Tatarstan's Search for Statehood, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova 
argues that the cultural concessions given to Tatarstan have allowed it to realize 
international relations beyond the realm of Russian foreign policy. These tie the RT 
into the broader Pan-Turkic world in the areas of education, religion, economic 
policy and foreign policy as a means to develop international support outside the 
RF. Crosston and Gorenburg both cite the development of Tatar linguistic and 
educational policy as two of the key platforms from which para-diplomatic relations 




Soviet disintegration in that they hint at the evolution of ethnic division in post 
Soviet Russia. 
Chapter Overview 
 In Chapter 1, I will lay out what I believe to be the root cause of the center-
periphery conflict in Russia today. The ethnic-territorial structure of the Soviet 
Union is a legacy that modern Russia has inherited. I will show that the 
establishment of the ethno-federal structure in the Soviet Union created the basis 
for the formation of separate national identities rather than serving as an 
instrument of assimilation. As time progressed these institutions created and 
reinforced the elite structures necessary to bring about national movements in the 
late 1980’s.  The rise of the Tatar national movement, which lies in stark contrast to 
the quick rise and fall of the Republic’s democratic movement, illustrates the 
importance of political and academic institutional support in the development of 
politics in the Republic of Tatarstan.  
 Chapter 2 contains the legal framework of Tatarstan’s bid for sovereignty vis-
à-vis the Russian Federation. Many of the institutional structures, i.e. political and 
cultural, greatly influenced the documents establishing the Russian Federation. The 
similarities between the Soviet structural models and the Russian model laid down 
in the Federation Treaty and the Russian Constitution directly influenced 




RT. This study examines how the Tatar Constitution and the bilateral treaty process 
contributed to the nation building policies of the Tatar government since the 1990’s. 
The incongruities between the Tatar Constitution, the Federation Treaty and the 
Russian Constitution afforded Tatar leaders the opportunity to negotiate a 
contractual relationship and a significant degree of cultural autonomy that the RF 
has had difficulty in retracting.  
 Chapter 3 will explore what Tatar officials have done to not only maintain 
but also to build upon efforts to socially and culturally separate Tatarstan from 
Russian society. I will show that the Republican leadership has taken the cultural 
revival agenda of the Tatar national movement, the TPC, and has adopted it to 
maintain power while edging out political opposition. The protectionist policies of 
political and economic sovereignty have been publically touted as beneficial to both 
Russians and Tatars which has served to legitimize the ruling elite as a fair and 
equitable regime both within the Republic and within the Federation. On the other 
hand, the cultural policies of language revival and development in the Republic have 
been implemented in such a way that they establish significant barriers for non-
Tatars to enter the Republic and participate in the cultural, economic and political 









Among the main competing arguments for the collapse of the Soviet Union 
are those that examine the organizational structure of the Soviet system and the 
institutions developed to control the system. The Soviet Union was modeled as a 
federal state comprised of national sub-units aimed at limiting the rise of 
nationalism. Control was exerted through a set of national institutions based on the 
markers of territory, identity and language, which were used to convey benefits to 
members of the proscribed national populations. Only members of the proscribed 
nationalities could be politically mobilized and even then, only those who were loyal 
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its socialist agenda were permitted 
to retain power. Therefore the Soviet Union was intended to be the new nation 
under which an ideological identity would supersede its national elements over time 
(Bunce 2004, 428).  
Many scholars argue is that the CPSU missed the opportunity to supplant the 
national forms with the stamp of a pan-Soviet identity (Hale 2003; Gorenburg 2003; 
Lynn and Novikov 1997; Roeder 1991). Broadly speaking this was caused by the 
entrenchment of the national elite groups and the stagnation of the Soviet economy. 
The ethnic elite cadres found themselves dependent on the economic success of 
their national units in order to maintain positions of power within the CPSU. In such 




their regions rather than that of the Soviet Union. The formal and informal ties of 
political patronage systems in the institutional structures of the national sub-units 
were employed to retain resources in the regions causing widespread economic 
gridlock in the Union.   
It is generally agreed that the formation of the national popular fronts arose 
with elite support within the academic and political institutions of the state. 
Whereas many democratic movements failed without political support and access to 
the institutions of state, nationalist movements such as the Tatar Public Center 
relied on a mixture of political support from the political and academic spheres of 
Tatarstan’s ethnic elite cadre. These Soviet Era underpinnings were vital for the 
continuance of regional opposition to the formation of strong central government in 
Russia during the early 1990’s. Without direct control over the institutions of state 
at the regional level, Russian leaders were forced to deal with regional leaders, such 
as Mintimer Shaimiev, on a bilateral basis.   
The RSFSR has often been likened to that of a miniature Soviet Union in that 
it contained its own system of national-sub units.  The same processes of elite 
competition and entrenchment occurring in the Soviet Union also occurred in 
Russia. The lack of a central government in Russia combined with its high 
composition of ethnic territories presented Russian leaders with a dilemma very 




without broad popular support in the regions or; work out a compromise with the 
regions? 
Formation of the Union 
The difficulties inherent in the formation of the Soviet Union were very 
similar to those affecting the formation of the Russian Federation and to that extent 
the RF exhibits a federal structure very similar to its predecessor. At the time of the 
1917 revolution, the former Tsarist state was a patchwork of disparate populations 
with a variety of cultural legacies, some of which had enjoyed statehood before their 
incorporation into the Russian realm. Nationalist challenges to the authority of the 
new state of the proletariat posed a real obstacle to its architects.  
 The solution to this dilemma was the adoption of an ethno-federal structure 
that would permit the reincorporation the Russian realm under a new government 
that would be sympathetic the multiplicity of its peoples. Thus the ethno-federal 
organization of the state was adopted by the Bolsheviks out of a desire to co-opt the 
political agendas of local leaders by offering an end to the oppressive tsarist policies 
aimed at the empires’ non-Russian population (Gorenburg 2003, 77). This initially 
permitted local elites to maintain their positions of power so long as they pledged 
their support to the Bolshevik’s socialist agenda. This strategy was so successful that 





   The creation of a state mapped along ethnic lines allowed the central 
authorities to focus on the rapid industrial and economic development of the state 
while avoiding complications inherent in cultural imperialism. The communist party 
 was able to usurp nationalistic challenges to its authority by prohibiting all but 
party-sanctioned political entrepreneurs from mobilizing their communities, and 
limiting the role of these entrepreneurs to the pursuit of the party’s agenda of social 
and economic transformation (Roeder 1991, 203). Centralized control of the 
economic welfare of the Union’s sub-national units ensured that national claims did 
not arise to challenge the center as long as local leaders were in competition with 
each other for state sponsorship for resources. Since Russia served as the source of 
central authority, the economic and social sponsorship of all-Union development led 
to the prevalent substitution of ‘Soviet’ with Russian.   
 Soviet identity reflected the transcendence of the party’s new socially-based 
values over those parochial values of ethnicity (Hirsch 1997, 276).  This 
construction was effectively used to espouse both the primacy and inclusivity of the 
socialist agenda both domestically and abroad. The primacy of socialism meant that, 
language and other manifestations of nationality were merely forms devoid of 
meaningful content without the doctrine of socialism (Gorenburg 2003, 77). Where 
ethnic identity, culture and language came into play, the state afforded each national 
unit a set of rights that were meant to encourage mobility within the broader Soviet 




cultural blocks within the USSR to provide maximal control and assist in the 
dissemination of soviet policy in the Union’s sub-national units. 
The complexity of identifying those cultural blocks cannot be understated 
and the pursuit of dividing Soviet Union into viable cultural-economic states 
consumed the better part of the 1920’s and 1930’s. The actual division of the Soviet 
state into ethnic states was based on Joseph Stalin’s primordialist definition of 
ethnicity as a “historically evolved, stable community based on a common language, 
territory, economic life and psychological makeup manifested in a community of 
culture” (Stalin 1950, 39).  Stalin’s view of ethnicity eventually formed the basis of 
later Soviet ideological and scholarly approaches to the formation of ethnic 
institutions. Nevertheless the difficulty of defining the plethora of peoples in the 
USSR forced the CPSU to encourage the use of clear and unambiguous definitions of 
nationality (Hirsch 1997, 274). 
 Identity was managed through the issuance of internal passports, which 
started in 1932, stamped with the ethnic identity (natsional’nost’) of the individual 
(Hirsch 1997, 269). Each citizen was given the choice to choose their nationality on 
the basis of their parents. Citizens born of two parents of the same titular group 
were obligated to claim the identity of that group, but individuals of mixed pedigree 
were free to choose the ethnic identity of either parent (Gorenburg 2003, 29 - 30). 




Nationality (natsional’nost) was eventually the term that the Soviet of 
Nationalities settled on as a means to convey benefits to members of the Union’s sub 
national units. After the completion of the 1939 all-union census, ethnic groups 
were consolidated into nationalities or natsii. This was done on the basis of defining 
nationalities along dense concentrations of ethnicities living in compact regions 
literate in their own language (Hirsch 1997, 274). As the Journal of Soviet 
Nationalities pointed out in 1934, “not every narodnost’ (in light of small numbers, 
underdevelopment and so on) was a national’nost or natsiia” (Hirsch 1997, 267). 
This resulted in numerous groups being forced into sub-categories of the new 
national states.  
 The resulting union republics encompassed the ethnic homelands of the 
largest titular populations within the Soviet federation. This resulted in the creation 
of set of new states that generally comprised the largest and most developed 
economic blocks of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the majority of the union 
republics had legacies of former statehood prior to incorporation into the Russian 
Empire.  It is also noteworthy to point out that union republics were only formed 
along the international boundaries of the Soviet Union. All other homelands of 
titular groups, regardless of cultural and economic merit, were designated as 
districts and provinces within the various union republics (Gorenburg 2003, 31).  
 The uppermost tier of the federal hierarchy was occupied by the 




served the administrative functions of the RSFSR, which would later become one of 
the key obstacles in the formation of a strong central government in Post Soviet 
Russia. The union republics comprised the second tier of the federal hierarchy. Each 
union republic was granted the right to national self-determination which included 
formal sovereignty within the USSR, the right to conduct foreign relations, and the 
theoretical right to secede from the Union. More tangible benefits included, 
representation in the legislative bodies of the USSR, the formation of a constitutional 
government in each union republic, a significant degree of autonomous rule by the 
local elite, linguistic autonomy, complete native language education systems 
including universities, and the creation of republic academies of science (Gorenburg 
2003, 31). The status enjoyed by each republic translated into subsidies for social 
development not enjoyed by other undistinguished ethnic groups. Strict central 
control over local Party membership and distribution of economic resources 
ensured that national self-determination was confined within the scope of the Soviet 
Union until end of the 1980’s.  
 Soviet autonomous republics formed the third tier of nationalities within the 
federal hierarchy of the Soviet Union. Autonomous republics had their own 
constitutions and local governments independent of the union republics. ASSR’s 
could even initiate legislation within the supreme soviets of the union republics, but 
they could not conduct foreign relations and they were not considered sovereign 




ASSR’s varied somewhat by region, but most ASSR’s contained local branches of the 
national academy of sciences which were dedicated to the study and preservation of 
the local titular culture. 
Education and National Elite Cadres 
 Education served as the primary institution used to maintain the integrity of 
the ethno-federal structure through culture building and for formation of ethic 
cadres. The ethnic federal structure of the USSR created an institutional demand for 
elite cadres to serve as the local face of the CPSU. The Soviet strategy for 
maintaining interethnic stability was not one of removing the root causes of ethnic 
conflict but one of eliminating independent political mobilization (Roeder 1991, 
199). Thus the primary purpose of the local elite was to control political mobility in 
the national republics. Socio-economic mobility came from dual sources; one from 
the ethnic quotas and institutions dictated by the center to each national unit; and 
two from the domestic policies of each national unit. The incentives granted through 
the nationalities policies of the CPSU and the education systems they afforded each 
nationality served as the primary institutional means for mobility within the Soviet 
community. Protectionist policies at the local level afforded the expansion of local 
elite cadres and their support bases while quotas at the Union level allowed mobility 
within the Union for members of each national unit. The expansion of ethnic 




territory inextricably together over the span of Soviet rule which contributed to 
inter-territorial competition rather than cooperation. 
 The USSR provided each national unit with its own set of national 
universities, Soviet academy of sciences, and funding of titular cultural education 
programs. The education of the citizenry in their native language and culture was 
incumbent upon, and the sole responsibility, of each national government 
(Gorenburg 2003, 37). In the broader Soviet community, mobilization of the titular 
population began with the hybridization of the ethnic natsii with the Soviet ideal via 
the education system.  These institutions offered local elites the opportunity to 
expand their influence in the regions though the extension of political patronage.  
 Political patronage was the chief means of conveying mobility within Soviet 
society while education served as the formal institution of mobilization at the 
national level.  Educational institutions were staffed by the ethnic intelligentsia, who 
constituted one part of the local elite cadre. The intellectual elite carried out the 
formulation of soviet curricula for their respective regions and were tasked with the 
articulation of local culture and traditions (Gorenburg 2003, 40-41). The political 
and professional elite relied on the intelligentsia as the shapers of the national 
legacy and the guarantors of national culture. The intelligentsia primarily originated 
from the urban populace and rose through the academic institutions of the local 
government (Gorenburg 2003, 37). They comprised the backbone of regional 




artists and musicians. The intelligentsia’s professional status and job security was 
maintained through close contact with regional officials, membership in trade 
unions, or other party sanctioned organizations if not the CPSU itself.  
 The education mandates of the CPSU had a profound effect on the 
development of ethnic identity in the Soviet Union. Second only to territory, 
language became the key symbol of national identity among titular elites. Titular 
languages served the dual role of indicating pastoral sentiments and backwardness 
in soviet society while at the same time indicating the authenticity of one’s ethnic 
background (Kondrashov 2000, 22-32; 46-49). The later perception was used by 
titular elites to convey their narodnost’ as a source of legitimacy. Absent any 
substantive cultural symbols and powers other than the quota systems and 
language education, the territorial boundaries of the national administrative units 
became associated with the political reach of the ethnic group. All territory within 
the boundaries of a given republic was subject to titular culture building and 
education programs while all lands beyond the national border were perceived as 
the domain of other ethnic groups. In this way the nationalities policies of the Soviet 
Union effectively set local political agendas and diffused local ethnic tensions. 
 Political leaders were often drawn from rural regions, through the process of 
political patronage, where their native language and local background afforded 
them political advantage over urbanized natives. This is important because as 




Russian ways, because Russians were the ones who first introduced these norms to 
rural regions (Kondrashov 2000, 30-31). Local systems of political patronage were 
developed over time between urban elites and rural officials to bridge the urban 
rural divide. The urbanized political elite therefore relied on the support of rural 
officials and their influence over the populace in exchange for political and economic 
benefits (Giuliano 2000, 304-307). The result of patronage was that urbanized 
members of the titular population faced significant barriers to entering the political 
structure despite the favorable quotas owing to the perception that they were too 
Russified to represent the larger titular populace. 
Decline of the Soviet System 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union occurred from dysfunctions in the 
institutional design of the state administrative apparatus rather than political 
failures within the highest levels of the administrative apparatus (Bahry 2005; Hale 
2003; Roeder 1991; Stoner-Weiss 2006). As Roeder argued in early 1991, the 
success of elite cadres within the institutions of state was defined by the fulfillment 
of production quotas and constant socioeconomic growth (Roeder 1991, 206). The 
economic subsidies supplied to the national units were used by local elites to 
expand their own political control at the regional level. This was achieved through 
the expansion of social mobility for titular groups through political patronage. The 
result was an ever increasing web of transfers through social networks which 




As the ethnic elite cadres developed their own internal support systems they grew 
less dependent on the center for support. Thus the state institutions intended to 
appease diversity in the Union and fund the consolidation of central power through 
economic development later permitted elites to make the argument that cultural 
diversity necessitated political and economic deregulation.  
 By the early 1970’s the last of the great industrialization initiatives were 
drawing to a close and economic growth slowed as the Soviet Union achieved one of 
its greatest feats: the industrialization of a state within a single generation.  
Economic performance measured by growth was still the measure by which the 
center evaluated success. Development was usually funded by the redistribution of 
resources from more developed regions to underdeveloped regions. Elites in more 
wealthy regions therefore, began to see continued growth as counterproductive to 
their regions because such growth would spur greater demands from the center.  
Elite cadres resorted to underreporting local production to stave off increased 
production demands from the center. Over time, political elites grew ever more 
protective of the resource subsidies their regions enjoyed and center-periphery 
relations were increasingly dominated by rivaling petitions from the national 
territories for funding from above (Roeder 1991, 206-207).   
 The very success of Soviet industrialization and the ever more complex 
economies of the USSR created more resistance at the national level. The increasing 




sustained periods of time resulted in increased deregulation pressures from local 
elites (Bunce 2004, 430).  During the early years of Soviet rule the CPSU relied on 
the great successes of the Soviet regime and the judicious use of the KGB, the 
enforcement arm of CPSU ensured that regional elites were willing to pledge 
unwavering support for the its policies. Among Khrushchev’s reforms of the 1950’s 
was the removal of the KGB as the enforcement arm of the CPSU and the use of 
social and material benefits to placate political elites. This resulted in a decrease of 
turnover in elite cadres, which Valarie Bunce cites as one of the prime reasons elite 
cadres were able to consolidate power (Bunce 2004, 429). Over time placation was 
becoming more ineffective as the center had very little else to offer local elites. Thus 
politics and economics were intertwined in such a way that made the center appear 
weaker as time progressed. 
 Gorbachev’s economic reforms in the late 1980’s effectively separated local 
enterprises from the political apparatus of the CPSU. Both the 1987 ‘Law on State 
Enterprises’ and the 1988 ‘Law on Cooperatives’ were meant to stimulate economic 
growth at regional levels by allowing regional directors to retain a portion of 
revenues for reinvestment, either in commercial applications or to address social 
and workforce concerns. These two reforms essentially gave industry leaders 
increased autonomy over their respective industries, and more importantly in the 
Soviet context of enterprise leaders as political and social leaders of local 




demands levied on enterprise leaders, de facto owners of their enterprises as well as 
the siphoning of regional revenues into private hand (Stoner-Weiss 1997, 39). 
Together these activities created a second set of political stakeholders for regional 
elites to engage for support as well as increased social demands from local 
populations resulting in a political slide toward increased autonomy demands from 
both political and popular actors. 
Popular Fronts and the Tatar National Movement 
 The Tatar nationalist movement developed out of what Kondrashov refers to 
as the non-formal movements of the Soviet liberalization process. These movements 
were there first appearance of an independent political and cultural society apart 
from the official political structures of the CPSU. These small movements convened 
to discuss a wide array of issues from environmentalism, historical and cultural 
preservation, religion, etc (Kondrashov 2000, 113). The agglomeration of these 
various movements under larger umbrella organizations created the basis of the 
early pro-democracy movements in the Soviet Union (Gorenburg 2003, 49-50) 
 In early 1988 the Baltic Popular Fronts, which were formed from 
agglomerations of various non-formal movements, were already well known 
throughout the Soviet Union for their political efficacy. The democratic movements 
of Russia, which were in communication with, and modeled after the Baltic Popular 
Fronts, were already present in the TASSR under the designation of the Popular 




to the lack of institutional supports, the nationalist movements developed later 
within Soviet political and academic institutional structures.  Thus the instability of 
the Soviet regime and Gorbachev’s liberalization reforms allowed a variety of 
political groups to access to the formal supports of the political and academic 
institutions necessary to achieve long-term efficacy (Gorenburg 2003, 50-51). For 
groups such as the Tatar nationalist movement this meant that they could legally 
seek out and lobby for support among the ruling elite, legislative bodies and even 
attempt to run their own candidates in local elections.  
Formation of the Tatar Public Center 
 After several failed attempts to create a Tatar nationalist front, the core of 
what was to become the face of the Tatar national movement convened, in June of 
1998 at the Kazan branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to develop discussion 
suggestions for the Nineteenth CPSU Party Congress. At the request of the CPSU, the 
group of about two-hundred academics and scholars from the Institute of Language, 
Literature and History, assembled to develop ideas on the state of interethnic 
relations (Gorenburg 2003, 54). Acting on the endorsement of the CPSU and mutual 
interest among the members of the Institute, the group agreed to organize the Tatar 
Public Center (TPC). 
 The formation of the TPC was originally perceived as cultural organization 
focused on the preservation the Tatar language, culture and traditions. This focus 




membership is best illustrated by the delegates to the first TPC congress in 1989. 
According to Gorenburg intellectuals comprised over 50% of the delegates, while 
another 25% consisted of academics. The creative intelligentsia, consisting of 
writers, artists and musicians concerned with the fate of Tatar culture in Russia, 
formed the third largest group of delegates at 18% (Gorenburg 2003, 57). The only 
major trade group to enter the TPC was the Republic’s teachers union who 
comprised about 7% of the delegates to the first TPC congress.   
 Taking from the experiences of the pro-democracy movements in Russia and 
the TASSR, the TPC organized itself into a loose federation of autonomous social 
groups both inside and outside the TASSR with the task of staging protests and 
mobilizing populations for elections. The TCP initially coordinated with the Popular 
Front of Tataria, the local democratic movement, which kept in close contact with 
the democratic movements in Russia and the Baltic Republics. The collective of TPC 
affiliates had members and programs that extended well beyond the borders of the 
TASSR. The key members of the TPC were the Marjani Society, the Bulgar al-Jadid 
and several other Muslim organizations (Kondrashov 2000, 117). Ittifaq, the Tatar 
nationalist party chaired by Fauzia Bairamova, who was also a member of the Tatar 
Supreme Soviet, became a high profile affiliate member of the TPC and was also the 
most radical of the organizations in the movement. 
 In addition to its informal organizations, the TPC leadership cultivated its 




was to develop ties with the local authorities and the CPSU. Rafael Khakimov, one of 
the organization’s cofounders, joined the CPSU obkom’s ideological department in 
order to prevent conflict between the Party and the TPC. Marat Muliukov, who later 
became president of the TPC was a professor of Communist Party history at the 
university and remained a party member until August of 1991 (Gorenburg 2003, 
55). The party ties of the organization’s founders and the political connections they 
later cultivated ensured the TPC the support necessary to transform into a viable 
political organization. 
Politics of the Tatar Public Center 
 The TPC became identified as a political organization after it announced a 
platform during its first congress in February 1989. According to the TPC platform 
the Soviet Union and the RSFSR had violated the Communist principle of equality 
among nations by allowing ethnic homelands with differentiated rights to 
simultaneously exist within the federative structure of the USSR (Gorenburg 2003, 
88). Thus the primary focus of the TPC was the elevation of TASSR status to that of a 
union republic.  
 The TPC approach to the elevation of Tataria was fairly traditional by Soviet 
norms in that it focused on cultural revival in terms of a language policy linked to 
ethnic identity. The key to their policy was the development of national language 
movement in the Republic, which called for increased education of the Tatar 




the Tatar language by establishing an independent Academy of Science in the 
Republic along with increased use of Tatar in print publications, radio and television 
and film. In addition to this they proposed to make all public spaces bilingual by 
replacing street signs and place names with bilingual signs (Gorenburg 2003, 51). 
Furthermore they called for the funding necessary to renovate symbols of Tatar 
architecture and culture such as the Kul Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin. In the 
view of the TPC these measures would elevate the TASSR to a level of functional 
autonomy, at least culturally and scientifically, to the level enjoyed by other union 
republics. An example of the differences in status between union republics and 
autonomous republics can be seen by comparing the union republic of Kirghiziia 
with that of the TASSR. Both the TASSR and Kirghiziia had comparable populations 
of 3.5 million and 4 million, respectively, while Tatarstan’s annual GDP amounted to 
17 billion rubles versus Kirghiziia’s 11.5 billion rubles. Nevertheless Kirghiziia had 
three economic research institutes with a total staff of about two hundred, while 
Tatarstan had one department of economics with a staff of three. Furthermore 
Kirghiziia was permitted to withhold five percent of its oil revenues for local use 
while the TASSR, a major producer of oil in the USSR, retained less than two percent 
of its oil revenues (Evangelista 2002, 98-99). Therefore sovereignty translated into 
increased social, cultural and educational funding within the Republic. The 




so much so that it eventually became part of the domestic policy of the Republic and 
the raison d'être for sovereignty. 
During the Soviet period the TPC moderated purely ethnic appeals of the 
exclusive treatment of Tatar culture in the TASSR in an effort to lend a measure of 
support for the Tatar leadership’s fight to elevate the status of the TASSR within the 
ethno-federal hierarchy. The political elite’s adoption of the cultural policies of the 
TPC was founded in the TPC’s concerted efforts to petition the local government on 
the status of cultural and social conditions in the TASSR. The adoption of the TPC 
platform by local leaders meant that TPC objectives were tied to the argument that 
political and economic sovereignty would benefit all citizens in the Republic. After 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, TPC objectives became much more radical 
before the organization fell out of favor after the signing of the bilateral treaty 
between Tatarstan and Russia in 1994 (Giuliano 2000, 295). 
Decline of the Tatar Public Center 
The focus on international self-determination of all Tatars initially led the 
TPC leadership to focus on the rights of Tatars residing outside the TASSR 
(Gorenburg 2003, 56-57: Kondrashov 2000, 118-121). At the time about three 
quarters of the ethnic Tatar population resided outside of the TASSR (Kondrashov 
2000, 86). Within the Russia about 80% of the Tatar population resided within the 
Volga-Ural region, with a significant portion or Tatars residing in nearby in the 




entire Tatar diaspora with the goal of building an identity based national movement 
within Russia, rather than that of the territorial model used in the Soviet Union.  
This nontraditional approach to ethnic mobilization dates to Joseph Stalin’s 
plan to incorporate the Tatars and Bashkirs into a single Tatar-Bashkir Soviet 
Republic. Stalin had hoped to secure the support of the Tatars and Bashkirs through 
the support of Mulla Nur Vakhitov but when he died the Bashkirs switched their 
allegiance to the White Army (Evangelista 2002, 98; George 2009, 60-61). Tatar 
nationalists have cited Stalin’s failure as a justification for sovereignty since the 
incorporation of both of the regions as autonomous republics in the 1930’s.  
The outward focus of the TPC led the organization into conflict with both the 
Republican and Federal authorities which ultimately gave Mintimer Shaimiev more 
political leverage when dealing with Russia.  In January of 1989, the Republican 
authorities were rebuked by the CPSU in Moscow for allowing the TPC to interfere 
in the internal affairs of other ASSR’s in the Volga region (specifically the Bashkir 
ASSR) (Kondrashov 2000, 118-119).  The TPC’s unorthodox approach to mobilizing 
the entire Tatar diaspora in the RSFSR contributed to serious rifts in the 
organization that ultimately prevented it from seriously challenging the Tatar 
political elite.  
The radical wing of the Tatar national movement, Ittifaq had a more 
integrated cultural-economic platform aimed to exclusively elevate and accentuate a 




majority of the TPC members who labored to increase Soviet style quotas to further 
elevate the programs that benefitted Tatars in the USSR, Ittifaq organizers opposed 
a multi-ethnic state and wanted full sovereignty for the TASSR. Ittifaq plans called 
for the republicanization of the large enterprises in the republic, such as the oil and 
heavy manufacturing industries of the republic (Gorenburg 2003, 95). The proceeds 
of exports from these industries would be applied to the cultural and linguistic 
programs advocated by the TPC. Furthermore Ittifaq supported private ownership 
of land but only for ethnically Tatar citizens. The group’s organizers called for a 
special relationship with the Arab and Turkic world which would reinforce the 
cultural revival in the republic by to providing revenues from the expansion of 
markets abroad and the development of a tourism industry culturally tied to the 
south (Gorenburg 2003, 91; Sharafutdinova 2003, 618-619).  
 The signing of the conclusion of the bilateral treaty in 1994 effectively 
ended elite support for the local nationalist movement (Crosston 2004; 
Kondrashov2000; Gorenburg 2003; Giuliano 2000; Stoner-Weiss 2006). This is 
because TPC demands became more radical as Tatar and Russian officials concluded 
the negotiation of the bilateral treaty. Ittifaq and the TPC routinely engaged in 
protests to undermine Tatar-Russian relations. In August of 1991 after the failed 
coup attempt on the Yeltsin government the TPC attempted to declare full Tatar 
sovereignty by the creation of an independent Tatar National Guard forcing the 




Republic (Evangelista 2002, 101-103). In 1991 Fauziia Bairamova staged a two 
week hunger strike to persuade the Tatar authorities to withdraw sponsorship of 
the Russian presidential elections (Evangelista 2002, 99). The actions of the TPC and 
Ittifaq never gained much electoral support from the public. In the 1991 race for the 
Tatar presidency, the TPC and Ittifaq, combined, enjoyed support from only 14 
percent of the voting public compared to the 19 percent support of the Communist 
Party (Evangelista 2002, 99). Furthermore the Tatar nationalist movement did not 
put forth their own candidate in the election. In the Russian press, Shaimiev was 
called “a… islet of stability” while his personal ties with Yeltsin and experience as a 
Soviet leader made Shaimiev and his group a much more preferable group to deal 
with than those of the Tatar nationalist movements (George 2009, 66-67). The 
strains between the Shaimiev government and the TPC resulted in a limitation of 
access to the government that they had previously enjoyed. In a 2002 article, 
Tomaila Lankina shows how Baskir authorities were able to stifle TPC mobilization 
in their republic by limiting TPC access to media outlets and the institutions of local 
government. Local authorities were able to smother TCP attempts to set up an 
independent radio station in the mostly Tatar town of Chakmagush (Lankina 2002, 
1045). In other areas they successfully blocked the publication and dissemination of 
TCP propaganda in the Bashkir Republic (Lankina, 1045-1046). Without the support 




 The demise of the TPC however does not mean that they were ineffective. 
The following chapters will illustrate how the governing elite of the Tatarstan co-
opted and instituted large portions of the nationalist’s platform in the quest to 
strengthen the sovereignty of the Tatar state. The development of the TPC illustrates 
how the intuition of the Soviet nationalities policy was applied by an emergent elite 
to combine a mixture of formal and informal organizations into a forceful political 
organization strong enough to affect regional politics in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia. 
Conclusion 
 The Soviet ethno-federalist state was intended to limit political and civil 
mobility within the administrative structure of the state and across the territory of 
the USSR. However over the seventy year span of Soviet rule, local ethnic cadres 
expanded the institutions of ethnic mobility in their own territories to the point that 
they were able to build local coalitions strong enough to lobby the center for more 
deregulation. Wealth redistribution within the USSR contributed to elite 
sensitivities and compelled them to take ever more protective stances over local 
resources. Without the ability to enforce, or rather command, complete compliance 
with their directives the central planning committees of the USSR were unable to 
maintain the smooth flow of resources between different areas of the all-Union 
economy. The reforms of the late Soviet period rapidly expanded avenues into the 




 The Soviet-style demands for economic concessions for use in the 
development of the national units became the platforms by which regional elites 
resisted central control. In regions such as Tatarstan this resistance manifested 
itself in the form or status elevation and sovereignty within the Soviet Union. 
Greater economic sovereignty meant greater potential for the cultural development 
of the national and further entrenchment of the political elite.  
 The formation of democratic and national movements illustrates how elite 
control of and participation in the local institutions were able to control political 
mobilization. Those movements who were afforded access to the institutions of 
state were able to mobilize effective political forces that shaped local policy well 
beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the following chapters I will show how 
the core of the Tatar nationalist movement was enshrined in the foundation of the 











Chapter 2: A Federation of Sovereignties: The Legal Relations of 
Tatarstan and Russia 
 
 
 The main thrust of Tatar political mobilization from the late 1980’s up to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was the elevation of the republic in the federal 
hierarchy. As noted in the previous chapter, the Tatar national movement based its 
claims on the principle of national self-determinism and the Soviet claim of equality 
among nations. During the period between 1989 and 1994 these claims were 
adapted several times by Tatar leaders to mount a campaign of legal separation 
from that of the Russian Federation.  
 An associated status with the RF meant the avoidance of civil war and 
economic disruptions during the formation of the Russian state. Contrary to 
arguments put forth by scholars such as Triesman, Tatarstan did not embark on a 
campaign to bluff the center into concessions for federal support of regional 
governments. This is apparent first of all because Tatarstan was a net revenue donor 
region that did not require subsidies to survive. Tatar officials did however desire to 
retrain those resources instead of paying them out to the central government.  
Before the 1991 coup attempt on President Yeltsin’s government which 
cemented the demise of the Soviet Union, the focus of Tatar national policy was 
firmly centered on a form of political sovereignty within the institutional framework 
of the Soviet Union.  Full political sovereignty within the USSR would ostensibly give 




development issues before them. Upon the dissolution of the USSR, the lack of a 
Russian central government strongly influenced the choice of Russian leaders to 
adopt the Soviet style ethnic federation of the USSR. The adoption of the ethnic 
federal system only exacerbated center periphery relations in later years by lending 
credence to political platforms in the regions that focused on state sovereignty such 
as that of the TPC and the Tatar political elite. The reconstitution of the ethnic 
federal system essentially enshrined the late Soviet era precedence of ethnic 
challenges to the center for more decentralized control based on the principals of 
national self determination.  The continuance of decentralization pressures levied 
by the Tatar leadership on the Russian center can be clearly seen in the 
constitutions and treaties drafted to define the two states and their relations 
between each other. This tactic ensured that the Republic gained maximal political 
and economic sovereignty for state building while the Russian center was at its 
weakest. In the following years the attainment of political and economic concessions 
reinforced the power of the Tatar political elite and the cultural construction 
programs as a primary element in the maintenance of the Russian Federation.  
The Economic Case 
the Soviet era Tatarstan served as a major industrial center in Russia, so 
much so that the Republic controlled a leading position in the energy, military-
industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy (Crosston 2004, 51). The 




output and seventh in agricultural output (Kondrashov 2000, 94). During the 
nineties the Tatars often cited the fact that the level of economic development 
within the Republic exceeded that of both Central Asian Republics and the Baltic 
Republics (Crosston 2004, 51; Gorenburg 2003, 89). For example the output of 
Tatarstan’s Kama Automobile Works exceeded that of the entire Estonian economy 
(Evangelista 2002, 98). Despite Tatarstan’s formidable image of industrialization, 
the Republican government controlled less than two percent of the revenues 
derived from the Republic’s industrial facilities (Kondrashov 2000, 96).   
 The Tatar leadership alleged that the TASSR was overly industrialized and 
socially underdeveloped. Marat Galeev, a member of the Tatar GosSoviet’s 
Comission for Economic Development, argued that “Tatarstan was a developed 
country many years ago” (George 2009, 65). The pressure placed on the central 
authorities was framed to combat the disparity between the region’s industrial 
development and the resources it received to address the social welfare and cultural 
needs of civil society in the Republic. Only one quarter of investments in the 
Republic were put into non-industrial areas as opposed to the union-wide average 
of 30 per cent and 32 per cent in regions such as Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and 
Belorussia. In terms of social investment, “[Tatarstan] ranked between 40th and 
60th in Russia in the provision of housing, hospital beds, telephone communication 
and other services” (Kondrashov 2000, 96).  Therefore the Tatar leadership believed 




industrial and social development in the TASSR. Therefore Shaimiev concentrated 
on gaining enough autonomy to keep the wealth in Tatarstan by exerting control 
over the privatization of regional property and establishing taxation rights over the 




Region Population, '000s % of total
1 City of Moscow 9,003 6.06
2 Moscow oblast 6,718 4.52
3 City of St. Petersburg 5,035 3.39
4 Sverdlovsk oblast 4,785 3.22
5 Krasnodar krai 4,738 3.19
6 Rostov oblast 4,348 2.93
7 Republic of Bashkortostan 3,984 2.68
8 Nizhni Novgorod oblast 3,775 2.54
9 Chelyabinsk oblast 3,715 2.50
10 Republic of Tatarstan 3,679 2.48
Russian Federation 148,543 100.00
Source: Goskomstat 1997, 378-380.
Table 2.1    Most Populous Regions of the Russian Federation, 1991
Region Industrial Output, Rb billion % of total
1 City of Moscow 77.0 6.14
2 Moscow oblast 61.0 4.86
3 Sverdlovsk oblast 51.5 4.11
4 Tumen oblast 42.7 3.41
5 City of St. Petersburg 41.3 3.29
6 Chelyabinsk oblast 35.4 2.82
7 Nizhni Novgorod oblast 34.7 2.77
8 Republic of Tatarstan 31.7 2.53
9 Republic of Bashkortostan 31.0 2.47
10 Samara oblast 30.7 2.45
Russian Federation 1,254.0 100.00
Table 2.2     Top Industiral Producers of the Russian Federation, 1991






The Parade of Sovereignties and a New Union 
 In the context of the Soviet Union, the elevation of an autonomous republic to 
that of union republic was viewed as a viable method to increase local control over 
regional development. The mobilization of the Tatar leadership against the central 
Region Agricultural Output, Rb billion % of total
1 Krasnodar krai 12.8 4.92
2 Rostov oblast 9.0 3.46
3 Moscow oblast 8.6 3.31
4 Republic of Bashkortostan 7.9 3.04
5 Stavropol krai 7.7 2.96
6 Altai krai 7.2 2.77
7 Republic of Tatarstan 7.0 2.69
8 Saratov oblast 6.3 2.42
9 Volgograd 6.2 2.38
10 Orenburg oblast 6.0 2.31
Russian Federation 260.0 100.00
Table 2.3     Top Agricultural Producers of the Russian Federation, 1991
Source: Goskomstat 1997, 255-258.
Region Annual Investments in Fixed 
Assets, Rb billion
% of total
1 Tumen oblast 22.2 10.60
2 City of Moscow 8.6 4.08
3 Moscow oblast 6.6 3.12
4 Republic of Tatarstan 5.9 2.79
5 Sverdlovsk oblast 5.7 2.73
6 Krasnoyarsk krai 5.6 2.69
7 Republic of Bashkortostan 5.4 2.56
8 Krasnodar krai 5.0 2.36
9 Kemerovo oblast 5.0 2.34
10 Chelyabinsk oblast 4.7 2.22
Russian Federation 210.1 100.00
Table 2.4     Top Regional Investors of the Russian Federation in Fixed 
Assets




authorities was a reflection of the battles going on between the CPSU and that of the 
union republics. Spearheading the struggle for autonomy were the Baltic republics 
which began directly challenging the authority of the Soviet Union when Estonia 
declared the supremacy of its republic law over that of the Soviet Union (Hale 2003, 
237).  The pressure Baltic leaders put on central authorities prompted the economic 
reforms Gorbachev pushed through the CPSU in 1988. 
 The apparent failure of Gorbachev’s reforms to placate the republics 
prompted him to offer a renegotiation of the Union Treaty to fundamentally change  
the meaning of Soviet federalism. In an effort to defuse the grievances among the 
signators of the new treaty, the CPSU adopted the ‘Law on Delineation of Powers 
between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’ in April of 1989, which 
declared autonomous republics in the USSR gosudarstva joined to the USSR by free 
self-determination of their peoples. This law had the potential to effectively 
decentralize the USSR and Russia in respect to its ASSR’s, which were to be tied to 
the Union rather than the RSFSR.  
 The Law on the Delineation of State Powers prompted the beginning of the 
‘parade of sovereignties’ when Estonia declared full state sovereignty from the USSR 
in April of 1989.  The law also afforded the RSFSR the opportunity to form its own 
republican institutions already enjoyed by other union republics. The lack of 
Russian institutions that mirrored all-Union political institutions had been a 




1997, 190). The CPSU decided that separate Russian institutions and political 
apparatuses would have been a threat to the legitimacy and integrity of the Soviet 
Union. Boris Yeltsin’s conflict with Gorbachev and the CPSU were defined by his 
attempts to carve out a Russian government separate from the central apparatus of 
the Soviet Union housed in the RSFSR. On June 12, 1990 RSFSR issued its own 
‘Declaration of State Sovereignty’. 
While the establishment of a new union illustrates the direction of Tatar 
national development within the framework of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
declaration of sovereignty contextualizes the development of Tatar policy vis-à-vis 
the Russia after 1990. The Russian declaration of sovereignty proclaimed all 
territory within the borders of the RSFSR subjects of Russia. Therefore all 
autonomous republics were reduced in status to ordinary krais and oblasts 
(Kondrashov 2000, 101).  Dissatisfied with their status under the Russian 
declaration, the leaders of the RSFSR’s autonomous republics announced their 
intention to enter the union talks after declaring their own republics full union 
republics. In an effort to maintain the integrity of the RSFSR, Yeltsin went to Kazan 
and famously urged the republics to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’ 
so long as they remained within the RSFSR (Kondrashov 2000, 102). All of Russia’s 
ASSR’s consented to Yeltsin’s plea except Tatarstan. Four weeks after Yeltsin’s 
speech Tatarstan issued its own sovereignty declaration proclaiming itself a union 




The Tatar declaration of sovereignty was an attempt by the political elite to 
free the republic from its position within the Russian federal hierarchy. Acting on 
the Soviet reforms, Article 1 redesignated the Tatar Republic the Tatar Soviet 
Socialist Republic thus attempting to undo the impact of the Russian declaration.  
Furthermore, Article 2 and 3 expressed the sentiment of the nationalist movement 
in the Republic by declaring the TSSR the home of all Tatars and the guaranteeing 
the rights of the Tatar nationality in the republic. Finally, Article 5 only 
acknowledged official collaboration with the USSR and the RSFSR in the creation of 
a new Union Treaty. The Tatar Declaration of Sovereignty firmly expressed the 
perception of the Republic’s place in respect to the USSR and the Russian 
Federation. The construction of a loose alignment with the two state bodies of the 
USSR and the RSFSR would serve as the goal of Tatar national policy from 1990 to 
present. 
In March of 1991 an all-Union referendum was held to determine whether 
the people would vote to preserve the USSR. The 1989 Law on Delineation of State 
Powers would take full effect under the new Union Treaty. In Russia, Yeltsin had an 
addendum attached to the referendum that allowed for the election of a Russian 
president (Crosston 2004, 52).  In Tatarstan this addendum was excluded because 
of the pervading impression that Russia and the republics within its borders were 




 However, the failed Communist coup against Yeltsin ended the hope of 
renewing a new Union and therefore dashed the attempts of the Tatar leadership to 
elevate the status of their region. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the 
political agenda of the TASSR was modified to take full advantage of Yeltsin’s 
promises of sovereignty. The singular goal of the Tatar leadership to build a nation 
from the foundations of the ethno-federal institutions of the Soviet Union can be 
clearly seen in their struggle to define a contractual relationship with Russia during 
the formative years of the Russian Federation. 
The Federation Treaty and the Constitution of 1993 
 
Yeltsin’s appeals to the regions of Russia indicated that the central 
authorities of the Russian Federation would adopt the ethno-federal structure of the 
Soviet Union. There was considerable debate over which federal model would be 
used in the reformation of the former RSFSR. The two models that won out were the 
territorial federal model and the national territorial model (Lynn and Novikov 1997, 
192-195). The territorial model was a model based on the federal structures used in 
Germany and the United States where the federation is spatially divided and each 
unit is equal within the federation. The national territorial model reflected 
something like the Soviet federalism where each titular population would have their 
own state with limited sovereignty within the federation. The ongoing struggle 




partially adopted in the two key documents establishing Russian federalism. Those 
documents are the Federation Treaty of 1992 and the Russian Constitution of 1993. 
In November of 1991 President Yeltsin proposed the drafting of a Federation 
Treaty for Russia and its constituent members. The Treaty was based on the Union 
Treaty that was to have been signed in August of 1991. The proposed treaty was 
intended to settle all center-periphery issues in one document (Crosston 2004, 54). 
Several scholars point out that the central authorities favored the creation of a 
strong centralized federation whereas regional leaders and the leaders of the 
republics favored a more contractual union with the Federation (Stoner-Weiss 
2004, 307; Lynn and Novikov 1997, 190-191).  
The Federation Treaty was actually a series of treaties signed between the 
federal government and each level of the Federation: republics; oblasts; krais; and 
the autonomies (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 311). The treaty defined the various 
responsibilities and jurisdictions of the Russian subjects which established an 
inherent asymmetry to the Federation which was used by more economically 
developed regions to exploit the weakness of the central government. The Republics 
remained gosudarstva, a status which they claimed in their declarations of 
sovereignty, and gained increased control over their own economic and cultural 
development while the other regions remained in the three-tier Soviet style 




“largely and unpopular compromise” which marred the integrity of the Constitution 
of 1993 (Lynn and Novikov 1997, 191). 
Tatarstan initially participated in the drafting process of the Federation 
Treaty but Republican leaders soon withdrew their support from the process for 
fear that the treaty was an attempt to equalize the status of the Russian subjects. 
Mintimer Shaimiev argued that the Federation Treaty did not treat the republics 
with the special status they had enjoyed under the Soviet Union (Crosston 2004, 
54). In March of 1992 the Tatar leadership held a referendum to determine whether 
the Republic should remain in the Russian Federation. The ambiguous wording of, 
“Do you agree that Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, 
which develops its relations with Russia and other states on the basis of equal 
treaties?” was hotly debated by the Russian authorities (George 2009, 62). 
According to many scholars the opaque wording was intentionally selected to 
maximize support of Shaimiev within the RT and maximize his bargaining power 
with Russia while allowing the Russian authorities to save face, especially in light of 
the fact that Shaimiev insisted that the RT would not secede from the Federation 
(Crosston 2004; Gorenburg 2003 Lynn and Novikov 1997; Stoner-Weiss 2004). The 
Russian Constitutional Court was unable to ban the referendum, but warned that the 
“wording can be connected with an unilateral change of the national and state 
system of the Russian Federation and mean the Republic of Tatarstan is not within 




The result was a 61 percent in favor of becoming an independent territory 
(Stoner-Weiss 2004, 303). A week later, bolstered by his political victory, President 
Shaimiev publicly announced his refusal to sign the Federation Treaty. Tatarstan 
and Chechnya were the only Russian regions that did not sign the Federation Treaty. 
Bashkortostan and Sakha signed the treaty only with additional clauses granting 
them increased control over mineral resources and foreign commerce. The refusal 
of Tatarstan to sign the Federation Treaty expressed the resolve of its leadership to 
press the Russian center in pursuit of contractual relations with the Russian 
Federation.  
The 1993 Russian Constitution was supposed to remedy all center-periphery 
conflict by claiming to equalize the subjects of the Federation. Under the 1993 
Constitution republics lost their claims of sovereignty and their right to secede 
(Lynn and Novikov 1997, 192). However the provisions of the Federation Treaty 
were acknowledged in the 1993 Constitution causing fundamental discrepancies 
that muddied the legal landscape regarding the status of Russia’s regions (Crosston 
2004, 29-30). Overall the 1993 Constitution attempted to institute a territorial 
federal model, a model which contradicted the one outlined in the Federation 
Treaty. Articles 71 and 72 of the Russian Constitution specified areas of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction and areas of joint federal and regional jurisdiction, however no 




(Stoner-Weiss 2006, 55). Furthermore, nothing in the Russian Constitution 
prevented regions from usurping federal powers on their own territories.  
The Bilateral Treaties 
The ambiguity of the Russian position set forth in the Federation Treaty and 
the 1993 Constitution was major cause of Russian central weakness in the 1990’s. 
This combined with the center’s institutional inability to affect control in regional 
governments, forced the central authorities to capitulate and deal with the regions 
on individual bilateral basis, thus further undermining the authority of the federal 
government. During the 1994 to 1997 period numerous regions assumed federal 
powers on their own territories with the backing of the Russian Federation through 
the signing of bilateral agreements. For example federal rights to protect and defend 
the territories of North Ossetiya (point 3, article 4), Kabardino-Balkariia (point g, 
article 4), Tatarstan (point 2, article 3) and Bashkortostan (point 2, article 4) were 
usurped by each of the regional governments. Both Sverdlovsk and Udmurtiia 
gained the control of defense complex enterprises (Stoner-Weiss 2006, 55). 
 Bilateral Treaties were negotiated between the center and Russia’s regions 
between 1994 and 1996 during a time in which the Russian government struggled 
to avoid direct conflict between itself and its regions.  The bilateral treaties were 
primarily intended to further define center periphery relations with the federation’s 
ethnic republics. Many Russian regions also took advantage of the Russia’s 




The bilateral treaties were drafted to address specific issues that were over 
generalized and vaguely outlined in the Federation Treaty and the Russian 
Constitution. They addressed issues of security, legality, fiscal policy and culture, 
education and social welfare. 
 Tatarstan set the precedence for the era of Russia’s bilateral treaties by 
concluding the first bilateral treaty with Moscow on the 15th of February, 1994. “The 
Treaty” as it is commonly referred to in Tatarstan preserved the Republic’s 
confederal approach to association with the Russian Federation. Like many of the 
treaties that were signed with other regions, the Tatar bilateral treaty enshrined the 
supremacy of the Tatar Constitution over its Russian counterpart, thereby allowing 
for the substitution of federal laws with regional laws. Furthermore there was no 
mention of any mechanism for reconciling differences between federal and regional 
legislation which effectively placed a barrier between federal authority and the 
regional government (Crosston 2004, 24-28). 
Tatarstan’s bilateral treaty with Russia legitimized constitutional 
contradiction between the two treaty signators. For example, the preamble of the 
treaty defined Tatarstan as a “sovereign state associated with the Russian 
Federation by constitution and treaty.” This effectively created a situation that 
implied a confederal relationship between the Tatar Republic and the Russian 
Federation, thus reinforcing the equal status between the two states espoused in the 




wording in the document to talk past each other when discussing center – periphery 
relations. To this extent Russian authorities insisted that the treaty was an intra-
governmental document while Republican authorities lauded the intergovernmental 
character of the document (Crosston 2004, 57-58).  
Article 2 of Tatarstan’s bilateral treaty listed the full powers of the Tatar 
state. Among these, Tatarstan derived full power from its own constitution and not 
from the Russian Constitution. Point 6 gave the Republic full power over all land 
issues effectively seizing all land in the region from the federal government unless it 
was already appropriated by law at the time of the treaty. Point 13 gave Tatarstan 
the right to establish its own national bank while point 14 vested the Republican 
leadership all power to oversee issues of privatization, thus sheltering the region 
from reforms in the rest of the Federation. Point 8 gave the government full control 
over citizenship and Point 9 assumed full control of conscription within the 
Republic. Relations with foreign entities and governments were granted in Point 11. 
Article 3 ensured that federal oversight and cooperation did not interfere with the 
Republic’s ability to govern itself while article 6 elevated the legal status of 
Tatarstan’s bilateral treaty to that of the Constitution of both Russia and Tatarstan. 
Putin Era Reforms 
 When President Vladimir Putin came to power in March of 2000, he came on 
a platform of building a unified legal and economic space in the Russian Federation 




the 1990’s. Yeltsin’s approach to maintaining power and the stability of the 
Federation during the transition from communist rule was to devolve numerous 
powers to the Russian subjects in areas where the center did not have the ability to 
enforce the law. The powers being concentrated in the hands of various local leaders 
had come under increasing criticism from Russian nationalists who argued that the 
national agenda was increasingly being set by the minority and that the trend was 
undermining the authority of the federal state. Putin stated that his aim was to 
reverse this trend and restore the integrity of the federal government (Putin 2000). 
Putin’s primary goals were to limit the influence of regional leaders at the national 
level, try to enforce a more spatially organized federal system, and reverse those 
concessions that conflicted with the Russian Constitution. 
 Putin’s first act was to issue a presidential decree on May 13, 2000 which 
replaced the more than eighty presidential representatives of Russia’s eighty-nine 
regions with seven presidential envoys (PEs) who were placed in charge of seven 
new federal super-districts. The seven federal super-districts were intended to 
create a spatially organized federal layer on top of the current ethnic federal 
systems to serve as an institutional barrier between regional governments and the 
federal government. The purpose of the PEs was to ensure the realization of the 
president’s constitutional powers, increase the effectiveness of federal agencies, and 
improve the system of monitoring the implementation of their decisions (Reddaway 




and were not legitimized by the Russian Constitution. In fact the PEs were a vaguely 
defined extension of the federal executive branch whose informal powers 
outnumbered any real formal power. According the Stoner-Weiss the envoys were 
reported to have had strong influence in the activities of federal agents in only 13 of 
the respondents. Paired with small staffs and weak funding Putin’s PEs “provided no 
significant influence” over regional governors or federal officials in the regions 
(2006, 84-85).    
 Putin’s second action was to reform the upper house of the national 
parliament, the Federation Council. His objective was to reduce the power of 
regional governors to influence national policies. The heads of regional executive 
branches were excluded from the Federation Council which was made fully effective 
on January 1, 2002. This was perceived as being a crucial key to subordinating 
regional power to that of the national government. Putin was successful in knocking 
regional governors out of the national political elite. According to its 2002 monthly 
survey of Russia’s elite, Nezavisimaya gazeta noted that the governors were no 
longer listed among Russia’s most influential people (Reddaway and Orttung 2004, 
28). 
 Putin’s third major act gave the president the power to fire regional 
executives and dissolve local legislatures if they were found guilty of violating 
federal law. Many regional governments had adopted laws that ran in contradiction 




reasserting the supremacy of federal law across the land. On April 4, 2002 the 
Russian Constitutional Court confirmed the power federal authorities to fire 
regional governors and disband local legislatures, but it made the procedures so 
cumbersome that it seemed it would be a power likely to never be used (Reddaway 
and Orttung 2004, 30). 
Since 2002 the Russian Constitutional Court has gained a degree of 
legitimacy in the resolution of issues pertaining to unconstitutional regional laws 
(Reddaway and Orttung 2004, 91). In the case of Tatarstan the sovereignty clauses 
in the Constitution of the RT have been amended and those pertaining to 
sovereignty in Tatarstan’s bilateral treaty were annulled. Unlike many other regions 
where the bilateral treaties were annulled altogether, Tatarstan still maintains its 
bilateral treaty with the RF.  
Furthermore Tatarstan had been permitted to maintain control over its 
major national resources companies providing the Republic with a major source of 
revenues. According to Orrtung, the failure of Putin’s Volga Okrug envoy to 
successfully negotiate revisions of the Tatar Constitution indicates that Putin has 
had to resort to personal negotiations with Shaimiev to effect the changes in the 
Tatar bilateral treaty and constitution (Reddaway and Orttung 2004, 161). Julie 
George suggests that an implicit deal has been worked out between Tatarstan and 
the ruling elite in Moscow. Since 1994 elections in Tatarstan have tended to support 




Putin’s relations with Shaimiev have not appeared to differ much from those of his 
predecessor. In 2000 Putin initiated legislation allowing Shaimiev to run for a third 
presidential term which was forbidden by the Russian Constitution (George 2009, 
162). As Valeri Zorkin, the chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, stated he 
“trust(ed) the leaders of Tatarstan that they are not willing to secede from Russia,” 
but he worried that the referendum would give “[a]differently minded leadership 
[in Tatarstan]… all [the] legal grounds to secede from the Russian Federation” 
(George 2009, 67).  
Conclusion 
The status of the Tatars as a proto-nation under Soviet law replete with a 
‘protected’ language and customs and yet with little sovereignty to exercise the 
growth and development on the nation has been the driving force behind the effort 
to elevate the status of the state since the Soviet period. The unfinished Union 
Treaty of 1991 may have given the Tatar leadership what it desired, but the abrupt 
collapse of the Soviet Union left the state tied inextricably to Russia as a province of 
importance. The negotiation of state power in ethno-federal terms, undertaken by 
the Tatar leadership in the post-Soviet period to present is testament to the strength 
and endurance of Soviet ethno-political structures in the Post Soviet Russia.  
 The inability of the Russian leadership to extricate Russia from Soviet law, 
specifically ethnic federal state structure, has been the primary cause of center 




ethno-federal structure as outlined in the Federation Treaty and the Constitution of 
1993. Furthermore, the ambiguity of these documents afforded the Tatar leadership 
the means to challenge Russian authority in the Soviet ethno-federal context. The 
assimilation of the nationalist platform of the TPC provided both the legitimacy of 
the tactics employed by the Tatar leadership and the degree of cultural sovereignty 
attained in the negotiation processes with the RF.  
 Despite attempts to rescind the concessions granted to regions such as 
Tatarstan, Vladimir Putin has proven no more successful than his predecessor, Boris 
Yeltsin, in avoiding personal bilateral negotiations with regional leaders. While 
many of the Republic’s more overt claims of state sovereignty have been removed 
from its constitution and bilateral treaty with Russia the Republic still possesses a 
significant degree of economic and cultural sovereignty. At present the Republic of 
Tatarstan and Russia seem to have come to an agreement benefits the two states 













The level of sovereignty achieved by Tatarstan in the form of cultural policy, 
language and education and foreign relations since the early 1990’s, strongly 
resemble major elements of the TPC platform from the late 1980’s. Language 
development and preservation became one of the central tenants of the Tatar 
sovereignty drive within the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. When 
used as a primordial descriptor, language becomes a crucial element in the 
foundation of a nation because of the central role it serves in the culture and 
traditions of the society in which it is used. It is not surprising then, that education 
was one of the three institutional supports of Soviet federalism. As Gorenburg 
explained, education was vital to the creation and maintenance of common 
collective identities based on strong intra-group ties (2001, 73-78). These intra-
group ties formed the basis of the systems of political civil patronage used within 
the Soviet Union.  Over the span of Soviet rule, titular elites used the institutions of 
education as a means to expand their political reach in the regions and further 
entrench their positions. In Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev played the threat of the 
radical elements of the TPC off against the Russian government while adapting large 




consolidating the Tatar people in a Tatar homeland that was symbolically sovereign 
if not completely independent of Russia. 
The levels of political and economic sovereignty attained in the bilateral 
treaty process enabled the Tatar leadership to implement protectionist economic 
policies in the Republic in order to funnel revenues back into the social welfare 
sectors of the RT to broaden internal support amongst Russians and Tatars (Stoner-
Weiss 2006, 102). Shaimiev used his informal personal ties to President Yeltsin who 
still trusted him more than the leadership of the TPC and Ittifaq (George 2009, 67). 
The Republican leadership was able to convince the central authorities that the 
Federation would benefit more from cooperation with the Republic even as the 
Republican authorities sought to retain a larger share of revenue from the RT’s 
industrial sector. The cultural revival platform of the TPC was then used to expand 
and reinforce the symbolic sovereignty of the state while cementing Shaimiev’s hold 
in the executive branch of the Republic   
Social Welfare in the Republic 
Current domestic policy in Tatarstan is centered on a language policy that 
strives to revive the use of the Tatar language in the social, economic, and political 
spheres within the Republic of Tatarstan to enhance the socio-economic position of 
the main titular group. According to the Republic’s official website, the aim of the 
Republic’s language policy from 2004 – 2013 is to guarantee the functional use of 




for full-fledged use in the mass media and the consolidation of the Tatar people 
(Tatarstan, 2010). Since the 1990’s a cultural program aimed at the creation of a 
civic Tatar identity through development in the Republic’s educational system was 
initiated with the goal of realizing the national rebirth of the Tatar nation 
(Gorenburg 1999, 262). The State program for the Preservation, Study and 
Development of the Languages of the Peoples of the Tatarstan Republic is a synthesis 
of Soviet-style entrenchment methods and the Tatar national platform to build the 
framework for a language based quota system and to encourage the migration and 
consolidation of Tatars in the Republic. 
According to the TPC platform the government of Tatarstan had a 
responsibility to help Tatars living outside the Republic. This included proposals to 
adopt limits on the immigration of non-Tatar workers into the Republic (Gorenburg 
2003, 90-91). The TPC’s objective was to ultimately create conditions that would 
promote the consolidation of ethnic Tatars in the Republic. As of 1989, Tatars barely 
constituted a plurality in the Republic as 48.6 percent with Russians comprising 43 
percent (Evangelista 2002, 96).  Furthermore Tatarstan needed to import workers 
from outside of the Republic to maintain full employment levels in the Republic’s 
industrial sector (Evangelista 2002, 180). During the early 1990’s the TPC 
advocated for the annulment of agreements to bring Ukrainian workers into the 
Republic (Gorenburg 2003, 91).The development of Tatarstan’s social welfare 




discussed later, suggests that the Republican authorities have taken the TPC 
position of trying to consolidate the Tatar population of Russia within the Republic 
of Tatarstan. 
 After the conclusion of the bilateral treaty with Russia in 1994, Shaimiev 
created a set of social welfare provisions aimed at protecting the citizens of the 
Republic from the deepening economic crisis in the Russian Federation. One of the 
Republic’s first acts was to raise the Republic’s minimum wage to more than two 
times the average wage in Russia (Graney 2009, 64). Furthermore food subsidies 
enacted at the same time have kept the price of foodstuffs less than ¼ the price of 
Russian foodstuffs from 1994 to 2004. This had the effect of increasing local support 
for Shaimiev’s cultural and state building programs. As Shaimiev stated, “people live 
better here in Tatarstan, and this is mainly the result of Tatarstan’s sovereignty” 
(Graney 2009, 65-66). 
Language, Education and Acculturation 
 The idea of national revival through a concerted language policy was a key 
point in the platform of the Tatar nationalist movement. The TPC language policy 
was used by the Republican leadership to assert control over the means of the 
production and dissemination of public knowledge from the Russian Federation 
(Graney 2009, 67). The language policy of the Republic was codified in the 1992 Law 
on the Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and the 1994 State program for the 




Republic. These laws were first proposed by the TPC in 1989 in the Plan for the 
Development of Tatar Education which were then approved by the Tatar Ministry of 
Education in 1991 (Giuliano 2000, 309-310; Kondrashov 2000, 121-129). The plan 
stated that the educational system must be based on the goal of Tatar national 
rebirth. To achieve this, the plan called for the creation of a state fund to provide for 
the development of Tatar language schools and for the mandatory instruction of 
Tatar for Russian schoolchildren (Gorenburg 1999, 262).  
According to the Republic of Tatarstan, the 1992 law, “creates the conditions 
for the conservation… and development of the native language [where citizens] are 
free to use the language of their choice in communication, education, training and 
creativity” (Tatarstan 2004, Sec. 1. Art. 2). Although both provisions have been 
modified since their inception the basic effect on Tatar society has remained intact. 
Together the laws facilitated the expansion of the national school system resulting 
in a unified program of Tatar language instruction from pre-school to post-graduate 
professional training (Crosston 2004, 62).  
The transformation of the Republican education system was expeditiously 
implemented during the 1990’s indicating that the national rebirth was a high 
priority in the RT. During this period, the former branches of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences (RAN) were republicanized for the purpose of building an independent 
national education system. In 1990 the Tatar branch of the RAN was the only 




alone in the city. In the same time period just under half of the Republic’s schools 
were converted to the exclusive use of Tatar as the sole language of instruction 
(Crosston 2004, 62). To put this in perspective, prior to 1993 no non-Tatar 
schoolchildren studied in the Tatar language and less than one percent of Russian 
people residing in the Republic claimed to know the Tatar language (Gorenburg 
1999, 262; Crosston 2004, 61). Between 1991 and 1994 the number of Tatar 
students who studied all subjects in their native language rose from 28 to 43 
percent. In urban areas over the time period these numbers increased from 4 to 28 
percent (Gorenburg 1999, 262). According to the Official Website of the Republic of 
Tatarstan as of 2007, Tatar language and literature was taught in almost all the 
schools in the Republic and of those schools 51.9 percent of the population is 
educated in Tatar only. 
 In 1996 the Institute of History of the Academy of Science of the Republic of 
Tatarstan (ANRT) was created with the goal of transferring the production of 
textbooks from Moscow (Graney 2009, 67). The purpose of this move, endorsed by 
the 1994 program for the preservation and development of that state languages, 
was to produce textbooks with a uniquely Tatar interpretation of the world 
(Sharafutdinova 2003, 624). According the Katherine Graney, the intent of this move 
was to push Tatarstan intellectually beyond the confines of the Russian Federation 
(Graney 1999, 616). This sentiment is born out in a statement made by a member of 





Peoples’ pivotal consciousness should be civic, oriented 
towards Tatarstan on the basis of its cultural-historical 
unity, and their self-identity should be based as a 
resident of Tatarstan. They may have a higher 
consciousness of Eurasia and a lower consciousness of 
their village, but Tatarstan should be the foundation 
(Graney 1999, 621). 
 
Such a statement leaves no place for a civic identity based on citizenship in the 
Russian Federation. Tatar educational reforms can be interpreted as a plan to 
execute the functional marginalization of the Russian populace in the region.  
 The language laws along with the Tatar Constitution have undergone judicial 
scrutiny since 2000 and many of the provisions have been modified or suspended 
however their effect on Tatar society has already been felt. In July 2004 the law on 
languages was updated to bring it more in line with the Russian Constitution. 
Originally Article 91 of the Tatar Constitution required that the President be 
knowledgeable of both Russian and Tatar. That provision has been suspended by 
the Russian Constitutional Court since 1998, but Article 93.3 symbolically implies 
the importance of Tatar for the post of the Presidency (Yagudin, 2006).  The current 
version of the Tatar Constitution still maintains Russian and Tatar as the official 
state languages and stipulates their simultaneous use in state governance and the 
publication of laws and official documents (Tatarstan 2007, Sec. 5, Ch. 1, Art. 80). 




early as 1995 as the parity between Tatars and Russians shifted from being roughly 
equal to an 80:20 dominance by Tatars (Gorenburg 1999, 263). 
 The reforms in the education system were implemented to expand the 
dominance of Tatar language in the civil society of the Republic. The expansion of 
Tatar language publications and television and radio broadcasting was designed to 
encourage the use of the Tatar language in public spaces. To this end transit signs 
throughout the Republic also became bilingual (Gorenburg 2003, 212; 218-219). 
Incentives for professional use of Tatar were included in the State Program for the 
Preservation, Study and Development of the Languages of the Peoples of the Tatarstan 
Republic which included provisions for a fifteen percent salary bonus for workers, in 
a number of professions, fluent in both Russian and Tatar. By making the language 
so ubiquitous in the public realm the language policies effectively situated the 
citizens of the Republic in a national community distinct from that of the Russian 
Federation (Graney 2009, 57). 
 The cultural element of the Tatar revival policies are similar to the proposals 
put forth by the radical wing of Ittifaq to make Tatar language and culture the 
centerpiece of a program geared toward the encouragement of tourism and foreign 
investment. A simple Internet search on ‘Tatar culture’ will reveal the importance 
the government has placed on this idea. A Center for Tatar Culture, tasked with the 
collection and dissemination of Tatar folklore, and the organization of ethnic 




establishment of this organization over “1,645 Tatar clubs, 100 folklore ensembles, 
and 1,063 Tatar libraries had already been established throughout the Republic” 
(Gorenburg 2003, 219). Many of these programs emphasized the Tatar connection 
to pan-Turkic culture (Crosston 2004, 62-63; Gorenburg 2003, 218-19; 
Sharafutdinova 2003, 616-19).  
Foreign Relations 
Since 1995 the Republic has developed international relations that reinforce 
and support the cultural development of the Republic. In 1993 Tatarstan created a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with goal of realizing state sovereignty through the 
cultivation of international relations. In 1997, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
abolished and reformed as the Department of State Protocol of Foreign Affairs of the 
President of Tatarstan (Sharafutdinova 2003, 616). This institution’s mission would 
be the development of foreign policy outside the scope of Russian foreign policy.  
The expansion of the post of the Presidency to include a representation role 
in the Republic’s relations abroad required an expansion of the state’s foreign policy 
personnel. In 1995 a Department of international relations was established in Kazan 
State University to train Tatarstani diplomats and international relations specialists 
(Sharafutdinova 2003, 616).  The specialists and the state they represented had a 
distinct cultural identity separate from that of Russia. 
During the 1990’s Tatarstan established seventeen missions abroad in 




Australia, the United States, the Check and Slovak Republics, Cyprus and Austria 
(Crosston 2004, 63). President Shaimiev signed many agreements pledging to 
increase “economic, scientific-technical and cultural” trade cooperation between the 
RT and various other countries. By 2001 the RT had established twenty-seven 
bilateral agreements with other countries (Graney 2009, 75). Most notably the 
Consulate General of Turkey opened in Kazan in 1996. Tatarstan has been most 
notable in its development of foreign relations with Islamic countries. 
In addition to the countries listed above, the Tatar leadership has cultivated 
special relations with the governments of Turkey, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan.  These 
relations indicate a desire on the part of the Tatar leadership to develop relations in 
parts of the world where their state sovereignty would be better legitimized and 
more respected (Graney 2009, 76-78; Sharafutdinova 2003, 616-619). The 
republic’s relationship with Turkey on the cultural and economic front has 
developed substantially in the past decade to include special trade relationships and 
partnerships in cultural exchanges (Tatarstan, 2009). 
In 2003 Mintimer Shaimiev, was nominated by Vladimir Putin to be the RF’s 
Special Envoy to the Islamic World. According to Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, attempts 
have been made by the Republican leadership to capitalize on the cultural ties to 
countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangledesh, Iraq, Iran, the UAE and Egypt in the 
development for markets for the republic’s industrial products (mainly machinery 




While such ties are not abnormal in mature federal states, some scholars 
note that these ties are peculiar considering the fact that the Russian Federation is 
not a mature federal state (Crosston 2004, 63). During the 1990’s the international 
activities of Tatar officials was frowned upon and openly opposed by Russian 
officials (Crosston 2004, 63). Nevertheless the actions of the Tatar government 
indicate that foreign relations are but one more realm where the Republic’s 
leadership implemented policies extending political and economic ties into the 
international community in an effort to symbolically, if not practically, develop 
external sources of legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
 The arc of Tatarstan’s development of a nation was founded on the idea of 
cultural revival of the Tatar people. Cultural revival was adopted by the Tatar 
leadership as the founding principal of Tatar nationhood. During the latter years of 
the Soviet Union the cultural institutions of the USSR were used as a justification for 
the increased autonomy and sovereignty within the USSR. This justification was 
based on the Communist principle of the equality among nations and the right of self 
determination among those nations. As I have shown this argument was used both 
in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras as a means to maximize the political and cultural 
sovereignty of Tatarstan.  
 Chapter 2 illustrates how the institutionalization of Tatar sovereignty during 




efforts of the Russian government. In this chapter I have shown how the leaders of 
Tatarstan have used the concessions they gained during the 1990’s to form a 
distinct national identity within the Russian Federation. Current domestic policy in 
the Republic is geared toward the revival of Tatar culture in an effort to build a 
distinct national identity within the Republic. The formation of a Tatar national 
identity is intended to marginalize Russia as a stakeholder in the RT while 
increasing Tatar control over the economic and social spheres of the Republic. The 
tactic of cultural revival is reminiscent of Soviet methods for forming systems of 
ethic preference based on the markers of language use within the regions.   
 Outside Russia and the Republic of Tatarstan, language and culture is being 
used to attract foreign investment and support for a region that is portrayed as 
being distinctly different from the host nation. These actions indicate a degree of 
legitimacy seeking beyond the Russian Federation while developing external 
sources of investment in the Republic’s cultural programs. Combined with the 
domestic policies of the Republic this threatens to affect the universality of Russian 












The challenges of creating a stable and unified Russian state are nothing new 
in the context of the development of federalism, modern nations, and the ideals of 
democracy. These three concepts have highlighted the challenges faced by the 
leaders of any modern state, save perhaps the microstate. Even today, Russia is 
considered the largest contiguous state on Earth. The questions of identity, whether 
of national or ethnic focus, are endemic to all modern states. Democratic ideals only 
compound the cleavages extant in modern federal states where the leadership is 
beholden to a social contract with the public.  
 It is worth mentioning that even in the time of Rousseau, the ideal ground for 
the development of a modern republic was that of the city state. The state of Geneva 
had what larger states such as France did not possess: homogeneity. A homogenous 
society in terms of common history, tongue, and religious practices were commonly 
cited as necessary to the formation of a just and equitable representative state. 
Modern states and even nations lack the characteristics necessary to avoid the 
buildup of inequity in the general populace.  
This study started out with the examination of theories regarding the 
development of federalism, ethnic and national awareness in the Soviet Union. It 




of what was once a vast feudal empire. The stated goal of the Soviets was to create a 
representative state that ultimately abolished ethnic and national conscience in 
favor of class conscience. However to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
successor state and strict adherence to the goals of a classist form of nationalism the 
architects of the Soviet State erred in favor of implementing an ethnic national 
structure that enfranchised the desperate populations of the former empire.  
This study illustrated the difficulties the Soviet architects faced in the 
attempt to mobilize their populace for the task of creating a new national identity. In 
many places of the empire ethnic or national awareness was sparse save for those 
who came from preexisting states before incorporation into the Empire. The 
institutional structures developed to manage these varied groups had profound long 
term effects on the political development in Eurasia.  
Among all the primordial attributes, language is perhaps the most significant, 
because language it is the medium by which social context is conveyed. In addition 
to conveying thought, language also receives and stores the context of the society in 
which it is used. As such language is the one primordial attribute that stands out in 
its ability to cleave populations. The Soviets recognized this and implemented an 
institutional structure that both enforced adherence along ethno-linguistic lines and 
consolidated populations to disseminate a purely Soviet agenda. Linguistic 





This study has shown the extent to which the institutional structures of 
education were vital to shaping and enforcing the cooperation of local elites to the 
purposes of the central authorities of the Soviet Union. The political and intellectual 
elite were reinforcing socio-political structures that served both to disseminate 
propaganda while simultaneously representing, if only formally, the ethno-linguistic 
subgroups of the Soviet Union.  
There is however significant weight to the argument that these policies failed 
because they were more successful in promoting social, and moreover national, 
consciences where none or little existed before. The Soviet social conscience, as has 
been shown, was materialistic in nature. The idea of a working society based on 
material progress is counted among one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet 
Union. In approximately one generation the Soviet Union developed from a 
predominately peasant based society to a fully modern industrial society. As is 
common for industrially developing economies, the change in productivity and 
development was phenomenal, however as the initial development came to an end, 
economic growth rates began to level out. The myth of ever increasing development 
and change began to become detrimental to Soviet society in that it fostered 
unrealistic expectations among both the leadership and the populace.  
 There is general consensus among scholars that the Soviet economy 
succeeded in developing economically depressed regions with the revenues 




agreement that this artificial development process depressed the Soviet economy at 
large and contributed to a sense of inequity within the material-conscious society. A 
strong argument has been made that these cleavages were expressed through the 
institutional framework of the Soviet Union; that is to say along ethnic-national 
lines. 
This study has demonstrated the extent to which national awareness 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and contributed to the political and 
cultural development of post-Soviet Russia. While the leaders of the Soviet Union 
were members of the Communist Party they were also the products of their 
respective nationalities. The ethno-territorial structure of the Soviet Union served 
as an institutional framework for agenda setting within the Union’s constituent 
subgroups. This system worked well in coordinating the industrial development of 
the country during the formative years of the USSR however as time progressed 
disparities in economic development arose and in response the central authorities 
redistributed resources from wealthier regions to poorer regions.   
As time progressed regional elites were able to build up regional support 
bases within their respective sub-national units. Ethnic nationalism played an 
important role here because the regional elites enjoyed the most support from their 
own ethnic cadres. Sub-national loyalties extended into the CPSU apparatus in part 
due to the importance of political patronage used to recruit and advance political 




developed among the national subgroups as an effort to retain material surpluses 
for use in the home region, as opposed to being redistributed elsewhere in the USSR. 
This resulted in shortfalls and halts in the supply chains of the centrally planned 
economy. The economy grew more sluggish over time as regional ethnic cadres 
worked to further retain the wealth produced by their separate regions. 
Simply put, the combination of a materially focused society combined with 
ethno-national politics gave rise to national claims that challenged the integrity of 
the Soviet Union. The leaders were Communist but their support bases inclined 
them toward nationalist politics. While the political reforms of the 1980’s were 
intended to placate the populace and grant limited control within the regions, they 
only succeeded in further tying regional elites to the will of their ethnic populace.  
Thus the reforms only accelerated the devolutionary process that had been in 
motion for some time.  
One can only speculate as to whether the Soviet Union would have survived if 
the Nationalities Policies had been abandoned after a generation in favor of 
cultivating a more universal national identity devoid of ethno-linguistic affiliation. 
The Soviet Nationalities Policies politicized ethnic politics making it a viable 
medium for mass mobilization in a time of stress. Nationalist movements arose first 
in the Baltic States during the mid 1980’s and spread even to the third-tier 




The supports provided through the academic and political institutions were 
vital to the growth and dissemination of nationalist movements. This study has 
shown that the rise of the Tatar nationalist movement, under the Tatar Public 
Center, enjoyed the necessary support from the Tatar intellectual elite to grow into 
a group sizeable enough to influence Tatar politics. It is clear however that the 
extent to which the TPC influenced the political process was determined by the 
political elite’s desire to accommodate the TPC during the waning years of the Soviet 
Union.  
In the RSFSR, leaders of the autonomous republics were engaged in the same 
struggle to increase their control over their respective republics. This study has 
demonstrated that the institutions that shaped national politics within the USSR’s 
national subunits were mirrored in the ethnic republics of the RSFSR. The 
inheritance of the Soviet legacy of ethno federalism was much more profound for 
the RSFSR because, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, Russia did not enjoy its own 
national administrative institutions apart from the all-Union institutions based in 
Moscow. The primary reason for this was to limit the establishment of an 
independent Russian elite cadre that would challenge the legitimacy and authority 
of the CPSU.  
The lack of a separate Russian government was a key contributing factor to 
the rise in power of the Russian regions. Foremost among these was the 




classification of the Tatar Republic as a third-tier national republic within the 
RSFSR. As with the union republics, the debate was often framed in economic terms 
and a significant ethnic-cultural component. Leaders of the third tier ethnic 
republics, such as Tatarstan, argued that the cultural development of the primary 
ethnic group could not be guaranteed without a greater degree of reinvestment of 
local production revenues. In the case of Tatarstan, Republican leaders argued that 
the Republic was over industrialized and socially underdeveloped because too much 
of its production revenue was used to subsidize development in other parts of the 
Soviet Union. 
Legally the debate over cultural status was set in the framework of 
Communist principles of equality among nations and the inability of the ethnic 
federal structure to treat all nationalities equally. This study has demonstrated how 
the Soviet legal perspective greatly impacted center-periphery relations between 
Tatarstan and Russia from 1991 to present. The same autonomy issues that led to 
the parade of sovereignties among the union republics manifested themselves in the 
legal documents establishing the Russian Federation. 
 The Russian Federation Treaty, for example, was perceived necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the state while the Russian government reformed after its 
break from the Soviet Union. In essence the perception in Russia was that the new 
federation was very much similar to that of the USSR and its respective ethnic 




opportunity to mold nationalist platforms to a policy that both capitalized the 
devolution of the Russian state during the transition, while maintaining a popular 
support base necessary to retain power through the promotion of protectionist 
economic policies in the Republic. In this way the Tatar elite was able to effectively 
dissolve the nationalist opposition while working to convince Russian leaders that 
economic and political concessions to the Republic were better than armed conflict.  
The lack of authority within the nascent Russian government combined with 
the adoption of the Soviet federal structure replete with semi-sovereign states 
profoundly shaped center-periphery relations in post-Soviet Russia. Tatarstan 
would not have enjoyed such a strong position of power during the transition had 
Russia been able to enforce regional compliance with state policies. The fact that 
Tatarstan was able to effectively gain recognition as a sovereign state during the last 
months of the USSR set the precedence for the republic to challenge Russian 
sovereignty thereafter.  
 The inability of the Russian government to clearly define the legal separation 
between the federal government and the regions in both the Federation Treaty and 
the Russian Constitution of 1993 allowed asymmetries to develop in the federal 
structure during the 1990’s. The failure of the Russian government to clearly define 
and evenly assert its authority in the regions afforded leaders, like Mintimer 
Shaimiev, the opportunity to usurp federal power at the regional level. This study 




Treaty was aimed at exploiting the weaknesses of the federal government to attain 
the necessary tools for the creation of a national platform of state sovereignty and a 
significant degree of cultural autonomy. 
 This platform was aimed at expanding traditional ethnic rights from the 
Soviet era into the basis of a distinct non-Russian national identity. In effect the 
educational and cultural policies of the Tatar government have attempted to fill the 
formal symbols of national sovereignty, i.e. territory language and ethnic identity, 
established in the Soviet Era, with real content for the basis of a new if not 
completely sovereign state.  These policies indicate a systematic implementation of 
the Tatar nationalist platforms developed in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s to 
impose cultural barriers to the socioeconomic mobility of Russian citizens within 
Tatarstan. It has been argued that the implementation of these policies indicate the 
true nature of Tatarstan’s resistance to federal authority in the ultimate goal to 
marginalize Russian influence so as to have sufficient cultural, political and legal 
legitimacy to demand full statehood in the future. 
Some scholars have cited the Tatar-Russian relations and the bilateral treaty 
process as the emergence of a new type of asymmetrical federalism, specifically 
‘Russian Federalism’. Such a federal structure would allow states such as the 
Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation to coordinate various activities, 
such as defense activities and international diplomacy, while enjoying an associated 




that at present, this relationship currently exists between Tatarstan and the Russian 
Federation. The current Russian Constitution, Tatar Constitution and Tatar Bilateral 
Treaty of 2007, confirm such a relationship. What is more difficult to prove is 
whether Tatarstan will eventually be capable of realistically declaring full state 
sovereignty from the Russian Federation. This paper has demonstrated that this has 
been the underlying goal of Tatar policy since the late 1980’s to present. 
 The cleavages that exist between the two states were positively augmented 
by the Soviet Nationalities Policies and the institutions of the USSR. Those 
institutions that supported and maintained the artifacts of national conscience 
survived relatively intact during the Russian succession from the Soviet Union in 
1991. The Tatar leadership has adeptly used the tenants of these institutions to 
continue the formation of a national identity formally promised but never realized 







ASSR   Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
CPSU   Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
PE   Presidential Envoy 
RF   Russian Federation 
RSFSR   Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
RT   Republic of Tatarstan 
SSR   Soviet Socialist Republic 
TASSR   Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
TPC   Tatar Public Center 
TSSR   Tatarstan Soviet Socialist Republic 
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